![]() ![]() My insistence on the consistent application of this normative principle is the foundation of the argument that follows. In section 1, I assert that lying in general is pro tanto wrong, that is, morally impermissible, unless there are exceptional countervailing moral factors that carry even greater weight. ![]() ![]() I argue, furthermore, that such lying is both unnecessary and, in most cases, ultimately to the disadvantage of the negotiator. My central claim is that lying in business negotiations is pro tanto wrong and no less wrong than lying in other social contexts. Perhaps the most notable case of this has been the half-century-long debate, ignited by Albert Carr ( Reference Carr1968), on the permissibility of lying in business negotiations. I believe this suggestion should be firmly resisted. The suggestion is that there is some kind of exemption whereby normal ethical standards need not be so strictly adhered to in a business context. While this is generally to be welcomed, it carries with it a risk: that we take its very subject title- business ethics-to imply that there is a distinct set of moral rules that apply only to business and that are significantly different from those moral rules that apply in society more generally. Business ethics has become an essential component of any business school curriculum or similar management training.
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